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NOTES
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation:'
Proximate Cause Dims the Bright-Lines of RICO Standing
INTRODUCTION
The Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization Act,2 generally known as
RICO, permits persons injured "by reason of" violations of the prohibitions therein
to "recover threefold the damages" sustained.' Because of RICO's broad
prohibitions, limitations on this hefty express remedy were sought. Several such
limitations proved successful at the federal circuit level, but did not survive United
States Supreme Court scrutiny. Although RICO has recently been significantly
limited by the "pattern requirement" expressed in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co.,4 it remains subject to further limitation. Recent attempts to limit
the civil RICO action resemble prior unsuccessful attempts in that they focus on the
nature or cause of the injury to determine standing. These recent attempts to limit
RICO through narrow standing requirements use easily administered rules, or
bright-line tests which permit courts to stop civil RICO actions at the outset. A
recent example of such a bright-line standing test was the importation into RICO
of the 10b-5 securities fraud5 "purchaser/seller rule" established in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp.6 and endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.7 This rule requires that securities fraud
plaintiffs be purchasers or sellers to have standing. Although superficially the rule
does not appear to deal with the nature or cause of the injury, in practice it has
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 ed. &
Supp. 1989).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee."
4. 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
5. S.E.C. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
6. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 343 U.S. 956. 72 S. Ct. 1051 (1952).
7. 421 U.S. 723, 95 S. Ct. 1917, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884, 96 S. Ct. 157 (1975).
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served as a proximate cause test disallowing recovery to derivatively injured
plaintiffs.8
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp.9 to determine whether every RICO securities
fraud plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of the manipulated securities to have
standing to maintain a claim."0 This question has divided the federal circuits,
some holding that civil RICO securities fraud claims" require purchaser/seller
standing, and others holding that they do not.' 2 However, an application to civil
RICO of bright-line standing rules concerning the type of injury claimed is
inconsistent with the legislative origin of these claims, United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and Congress' instruction to construe the statute liberally.' 3
The purposes of RICO, though arguably too broad, require a standing analysis
touching policy considerations, the nature of the injury, and other relevant factors
concerning the relation between the plaintiff, the plaintiff's injury, the alleged
wrongdoer, and RICO.
14
Refusing to address the bright-line rule of purchaser/seller status, the majority
analyzed factors it considered crucial in Holmes to determine standing. The
majority's refusal to address a bright-line rule concerning the relation of plaintiff
to the alleged wrongdoer and the alleged wrongful act is significant in that it
recognizes the inappropriateness of bright-line rules concerning injury in the civil
RICO context. The proper vehicle for such analysis is proximate cause, and
through it the majority denied standing to the indirectly, or-more precisely
stated-derivatively injured plaintiff in the case. Holmes is the most recent and
significant treatment of RICO standing, and the proximate cause analysis required
by the Court deserves examination in light of its effect on the purchaser/seller
requirement and two evolving RICO standing tests: (1) the "investment injury"
requirement and (2) the "direct injury" requirement."
First, by taking the standing inquiry, previously phrased in terms of the
purchaser/seller requirement, and placing it in its correct theoretical catego-
ry-proximate cause-Holmes has illuminated an existing division among the
circuits concerning RICO standing and the requisite relation of the RICO violation
and the injury claimed under section 1962(a). Several circuits require civil RICO
plaintiffs who sue under section 1962(a) to show that their injuries were the result
8. See infra part 1II.
9. Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1322 (1992).
10. Id. at 1322 (O'Connor. J., concurring).
11. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 151-54 (4th Cir. 1987); Brannan v.
Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 1986).
12. Vigman v. SIPC, 908 F.2d 1461, 1465-67 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Viginan II]; Warner
v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987).
13. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479,497-98, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285-86 (1985)
(quoting RICO, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947); see also infra note 77 and accompanying
text.
14. See infra note 97.
15. See discussion infra part IV.
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"of the use or investment of racketeering income."16 This difficult task will rarely
be accomplished and does not comport with the legislative intent of RICO. 7
Although the Court in Holmes did not explicitly address this division, its reasoning
offers an approach which implicitly resolves the conflict against the "investment
injury" requirement."
Second, in its proximate cause analysis the majority emphasized directness as
a "central element"'9 to the RICO proximate cause inquiry, but in so doing merely
imported derivative lawsuit standing requirements into RICO standing require-
ments. Directness of the injury is a factor in any proximate cause analysis.
Likewise, because derivative lawsuits require the suit to be brought on behalf of the
entity injured, the necessarily indirect nature of a shareholder's injury is clearly
important in those cases as well. Thus, because directness has its place in both
areas, its use is inevitable in proximate cause analyses involving shareholders and
analogous plaintiffs. However, absent a derivative injury, Holmes should not be
misread to stand for (nor endorse) any type of bright-line test requiring a "direct
injury" for RICO standing. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with both the
broad language of RICO and the majority's pointed refusal to address the bright-
line rule involving the plaintiff's status as a purchaser or seller.
This note examines the proximate cause/standing test of Holmes, suggests that
proximate cause is the model for future RICO standing analysis, 20 and concludes
that bright-line tests are therefore inappropriate in the RICO standing context.
First, the note gives the facts, reasoning, and holding of Holmes. Second, it
contrasts the courts' experience in limiting the private 1Ob-5 action with the courts'
experience in limiting the civil RICO action and summarizes the arguments against
the recent attempt by the courts to limit RICO by applying the lOb-5 purchas-
er/seller requirement to civil RICO actions. Third, the note suggests that the
Supreme Court has dealt wisely with issues that the lower courts had been handling
as purchaser/seller questions to preclude standing to plaintiffs whose injuries were
"purely contingent" on a third party's injury. By addressing only the issues that
arose from the facts, however, the Court did not deny standing to other types of
non-purchaser plaintiffs whose positions had never really been considered by the
courts but whose RICO suits would have been precluded under a blanket
purchaser/seller rule. While the standing of these remaining non-derivative, non-
purchasing plaintiffs has not yet been decided, at least the correct analytical
16. See, e.g., Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702, 708 (3d Cir. 1991).
17, "Because [the use of investment of funds gotten from racketeering activity] is not traceable.
no causal connection between the use or investment of ill gotten cash and an injury to the plaintiff
is provable." Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 806-07
(E.D. La. 1986).
18. Holmes offers an approach which, unlike the presently evolving bright-line tests for RICO.
standing, is consistent with the language and policy of RICO. Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311
(1992).
19. Id. at 1318.
20. See infra note 97.
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framework has been established. These cases are to be governed by general
principles of common-law proximate cause. Ironically, the considerations which
gave rise to the purchaser/seller rule will likely drive the new RICO standing
analysis (proximate cause) to a denial of standing to plaintiffs whose injuries are
solely speculative.2 Lastly, this note examines the two evolving standing tests in
the lower courts that, like the purchaser/seller requirement, have been used as
simple means to deny plaintiffs standing. The note suggests that the proponents of
the-new tests misread Holmes and that the correct standing analysis under Holmes
is, again, one of proximate cause. The note concludes that directness is dispositive
only in derivative-type civil RICO actions and that the so-called "investment
injury" division should be resolved in favor of the minority view.
I. THE FACTS OF HOLMES
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is a nonprofit corporation
formed pursuant to the authority of the Securities Investor Protection Act. 2
SIPC's purpose is to disburse securities and cash to customers of failed broker-
dealers. To the extent that the pool of customers' property is inadequate, SIPC
must advance up to $500,000 per customer.3
In Holmes, SIPC alleged that seventy-five defendants engaged in a fraudulent
scheme of stock manipulation of six companies that ultimately caused the failure
of two broker-dealers.24 SIPC consequently had to pay over $13 million to cover
the claims for securities and cash owed the customers of these firms."
Because the customers who had purchased the manipulated securities had
brought their own suit against the conspirators, SIPC had only the non-purchasing
customers as a link to the wrongdoers. SIPC brought its suit as subrogee of these
customers.26 The district court held that SIPC's claim failed because the parties
21. Id.
22. 84 Stat. 1636, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (1970).
23. "With respect to a customer's cash on deposit with the broker-dealer, SIPC is not obligated
to advance more than $100,000 per customer." 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a)(1) (1970). Holmes, 112 S.
Ct. at 1314 n.2.
24. Holmes allegedly participated in the fraud by making false statements about prospects of
one of the six companies of which he was an officer, director, and majority shareholder. SIPC v.
Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1990).
25. The Court stated:
[T]he allegations were that, from 1964 through July 1981, the defendants manipluted stock
of six companies by making unduly optimistic statements about their prospects and by
continually selling small numbers of shares to create the appearance of a liquid market;
that the broker-dealers bought substantial amounts of the stock with their own funds; that
the market's perception of the fraud in July 1981 sent the stocks plummeting; that this
decline caused the broker-dealers' financial difficulties resulting in their eventual
liquidation and SIPC's advance of nearly $13 million to cover their customers' claims.
Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1315.
26. Because SIPC argued that it was subrogor to these non-purchasing customers, the
purchaser/seller requirement of 10b-5 became the central standing issue. See id. at 1319.
1914 [Vol. 53
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to whom SIPC claimed subrogation rights were not purchasers or sellers of the
manipulated securities. 2 Because SIPC had only the rights of its subrogor and its
subrogor lacked standing, SIPC also lacked standing. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, reversed that decision and held that there is no purchaser/seller
requirement for civil RICO securities fraud claims. Therefore, the non-purchasing
customers had standing to sue the conspirators, and SIPC as subrogee to the
customers likewise had standing to sue the wrongdoers.28
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether SIPC could
maintain its action against the wrongdoers based on the non-purchasers' injuries.
Without resolving the division among the circuits centering on the purchaser/seller
requirement, the majority reasoned (in a manner analogous to a dismissal of a
derivative lawsuit29 brought on behalf of an indirectly injured individual) that the
indirectly injured customers lacked standing. However, the reasoning used by the
majority differed from a dismissal of a derivatively injured plaintiff's suit in one
important way. Instead of focusing on the plaintiff's mere ownership interest in the
first injury, the Court based dismissal on want of a proximately caused injury.3"
27. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that only purchasers and/or sellers have standing to maintain a private lOb-5
securities fraud action. The district court in Hohnes applied the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser/seller
requirement to this security fraud claim even though this claim was also brought under RICO. See
SIPC v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985).
28. In response to the lower courts' reason for granting summary judgment against SIPC-no
proximate causation-the appellate court held that the crucial causal link is between the conspirators
and SIPC's injury. Vigman III, 908 F.2d 1461 (1990).
29. Black's Law Dictionary 399 (5th ed. 1979) provides that "[ain action is a derivative action
when the action is based upon a primary right of the corporation, but is asserted on its behalf by the
stockholder because of the corporation's failure, deliberate or otherwise, to act upon the primary
right." (citing Lehrman v. Godchaux Sugars, 138 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (1955)).
30. A derivatively injured plaintiff suing on his own behalf is dismissed because his injury
exists only to the extent of his ownership interest in the primary injury, and he should therefore not
be permitted to recover personally for the injury of another person (or entity). See Dayton Monetary
Assocs. v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 1995 W.L. 410503 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Attick
v. Valeria Assocs., 1992 W.L. 58868 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericson, Inc., 794
F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987, 107 S. Ct. 579 (1986). For instance, a
shareholder wants to sue a person who has harmed a corporation in which he holds stock on the
grounds that the wrongdoer caused the value of the shareholder's stock to decrease. Although the
shareholder may have sufferred loss, the corporation was the entity that suffered the whole injury.
The derivative plaintiff has only a fraction interest in that whole injury. Whereas derivative plaintiff
dismissal focuses on the ownership interest in the injury, proximate cause deals with causation,
foreseeability, directness of injury, and other various policy considerations. Although the field of
derivative lawsuits arose in response to the corporate entity, the purpose of the doctrine resembles
the purpose of proximate cause-to determine through an analysis of causation, injury, and various
policy considerations, the legal limits of an actor's liability to various plaintiffs for a particular
wrongful act. In derivative lawsuits, however, the most crucial factor in determining the plaintiffs
ability (or inability) to recover is the identity of the plaintiff. This factor is also the focal point of
all proximate cause factors, e.g., directness, foreseeability, causation. In addition, the derivative
lawsuit amplifies other policy considerations that less frequently determine the outcome of proximate
cause inquiries, e.g., priority of claims, circumvention of others' claims and of corporate managerial
19931 1915
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Specifically, the Court in Holmes held that a person lacked standing to sue under
RICO based on the theory that a RICO violation inflicted injury on a third party,
which injury in turn caused injury to the plaintiff. Quoting Justice Holmes, Justice
Souter emphasized that "[t]he general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at
least, is not to go beyond the first step."3t
In support of this holding, the Court traced the proximate cause element of
RICO to its legislative origin. Section 1964(c) (allowing civil RICO action) was
modeled on section 4 of the Clayton Act, which was itself based on section 7 of the
Sherman Act, which had been read to "incorporate common law [sic] principles of
proximate causation. 3 Justice Souter emphasized "directness" as a central factor
in RICO proximate cause as applied to the derivatively injured plaintiffs in Holmes:
[A]mong the many shapes [proximate cause] took at common law, was a
demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged. Thus, a plaintiff who complained of harm
flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the
defendant's acts was generally said to stand at too remote a distance to
recover .... Although such directness of relationship is not the sole
requirement of Clayton Act causation, it has been one of its central
elements.
33
The Court emphasized "directness" for a variety of reasons, all of which address
the concerns of victims who hold the primary right to the central injury; in Holmes,
the broker-dealers were these victims. First, the less direct an injury is, the more
difficult it becomes to ascertain the quantum of damages attributable to the
violation. 4 Second, recognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force
courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed
at different levels of injury to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.35 Third,
directly injured victims will generally ."vindicate the law as private attorneys
general, without any problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more
remotely. 3 6 Fourth, attempts by indirectly injured victims could be an attempt
to circumvent the relative priority its claim would have in the directly injured
victim's liquidation proceedings. 37 Lastly, the Court noted that "[a]llowing suits
by those injured only indirectly would open the door to 'massive and complex
authority.
31. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenter, 459 U.S. 519, 534, 103 S. Ct. 897,
906 (1983) (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531. 533. 38 S. Ct.
186 (1918)).
32. Holmes v. SIPC. 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1317 (1992).
33. Id. at 1318 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 1318-22.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1321. See generally Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
877 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1989).
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damages litigation which would not only burden the courts, but also undermine the
effectiveness of treble damages suit.'
38
Further, justifying its inattention to the purchaser/seller requirement, the
majority stated that all "the conflicting cases ... could have been resolved on
proximate-causation grounds, and ... none involved litigants like those in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores," 39 i.e., plaintiffs who claim they "would
have" purchased but for the defendant's act of securities fraud. Thus, the majority
was unwilling to conclude on facts different from those presented in Blue Chip
Stamps that there is no purchaser/seller requirement for civil RICO securities fraud
claims. By refusing to address the purchaser/seller issue, the majority highlighted
the need for a test susceptible of application in a variety of cases in which a bright-
line rule such as the purchaser/seller requirement could lead to unwarranted results.
Nonetheless, the Court's proximate cause test for RICO standing will deny most
non-purchasers and non-sellers standing when those plaintiffs allege securities
fraud as the defendant's predicate offense.40 Only through proximate cause,
however, are the remaining non-purchasers and non-sellers protected from
unjustifiable denial of their legislative remedy in RICO.
II. THE 10B-5 AND RICO PRIVATE ACTIONS: THE COURT'S EXPERIENCE WITH
LIMITINGIMPLIED AND EXPRESS ACTIONS
Rule lOb-5 prohibits (1) fraudulent devices and schemes, (2) misstatements
and omissions of material facts, and (3) acts and practices that operate as a fraud
or deceit." In 1946, a federal district court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.4
2
held that rule 1Ob-5 gives a private remedy to injured investors. 43 Twenty-four
years later, the United States Supreme Court gave informal approval 4  to the
implied remedy found in lOb-5 by the Kardon court.45 Because the private lOb-5
38. Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1321 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 545, 103 S. Ct. 897, 912 (1983)).
9. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322.
P40. See infra part Il1. There I argue that victims of securities fraud who purchase or sell the
mapipulated securities are directly injured (among the "first steps"), and victims who are not
purchasers or sellers will generally be indirectly injured-except for victims like the plaintiffs in
Blue Chip Stamps who "would have" purchased or sold securities. And those plaintiffs' claims may
not survive under the policies enumerated in Blue Chip Stamps, i.e., difficulty in proving causation
and extent of "would be" profit. But see infra note 97.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
42. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
43. Thomas L. Hazen, 2 Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation 63 (2d ed. 1992).
44. Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9,
92 S. Ct. 165, 169 n.9 (1971), on remand, 401 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Court ratified
without discussion the "established" view that 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 created an implied right of
action. Therefore, although never actually considered, the existence of a private right of action is
accepted by the United States Supreme Court. See Holmes v. SIPC., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1322 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Hazen, supra note 43, at 63. For writings on evolution of the lOb-5 remedy, Professor
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action was judicially created, the Supreme Court has limited the action as it has
seen fit.
The first limitation of the implied lOb-5 private action occurred in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 6 The Blue Chip Stamps plaintiffs contended that
they "would have" purchased a particular security but for the defendant's alleged
misleading statements. The United States Supreme Court denied these would-be
purchasers standing to maintain a lOb-5 action. The Court held that to maintain
such an action, the plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller of the manipulated
securities. This conclusion was based on the difficulty of determining causation
and injury and the policy against enhancing the settlement value of these types of
suits. 4 7 Although the purchaser/seller requirement arose from pure policy
considerations, the Blue Chip Stamps limitation was entirely within the Court's
authority. If the courts could create the implied right of action, the courts could
also limit it.48 The judiciary did not (and does not) have the same liberty,
however, with the legislatively created RICO private action.
RICO was designed to "eradicate... organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies."49
RICO prohibits the (1) investment of income derived from a pattern of racketeer-
ing, (2) the acquisition or maintenance of an interest in an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering, (3) conduct or participation of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering, and (4) conspiracy to do any of the first three things. 50
The acts, generally known as predicate acts, which, in appropriate combinations
Hazen recommends: Louis Loss, 3 Securities Regulation 1763-1805 (2d ed. 1961); Craig J. Cobine,
Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule lOb-5 Actions, 1972 U. Ill. L.J. Forum 651 (1972);
David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lob-5: Judicial Revision of The Legislative Intent, 57
Nw. U. L. Rev. 627 (1962-1963).
46. The Court articulated its misgivings regarding the development of lOb-5 actions as follows:
"When we deal with private actions under Rule 1Ob-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn .... [lI]t would be disingenuous to suggest that either
Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state
of the law with respect to l0b-5." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723, 7375, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1926,
reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884, 96 S. Ct. 157 (1975) (approving of the purchaser/seller requirement
created in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956, 72
S. Ct. 1051 (1952)).
47. These suits may have very little substantive value, but because of the complex issues of fact
(i.e., whether the misrepresentations caused the party to forego the purchase), the suit is made more
expensive by the day by day accumulation of attorney fees, etc. The continuation of the suit is
sufficiently costly to encourage settlement even though both sides know the actual weakness of the
claim. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 112 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (1991).
48. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1923 (1975).
49. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1961, 1962 (1988 ed. & Supp. 1989). A pattern of racketeering in the context
of securities fraud is defined as at least two "offense[s] involving fraud ... in the sales of securities
... the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any years of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id. at § 1961(1) & (5).
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over time,"1 may constitute a pattern, include such offenses as securities fraud,
wire fraud, mail fraud, murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, and
bribery.52 Essentially, the predicate acts are those criminal acts that may be
associated with activities of organized crime. 3 Although RICO was principally
a criminal statute, Congress also provided attractive private remedies to persons
injured by violations of RICO, permitting them to recover treble damages 4 and
litigafion expenses including attorney's fees.5
RICO's goal of "eradicating organized crime" is thus partially realized through
the action of individuals injured by activity prohibited by the statute. Allowing
individuals injured "by reason of' a violation of section 1962 to act as private
attorneys general helps solve the "serious national problem for which public
prosecutorial resources [were] deemed inadequate."57 However, in providing for
"enhanced sanctions and new remedies," Congress gave the statute a broad reach
susceptible to abuse in pursuit of the treble damages permitted by the statute. In
response to what was considered misuse of civil RICO actions, 5a many courts
sought to limit RICO's reach.59
Several attempts to limit RICO were unsuccessful. One such attempt, rejected
by an overwhelming majority of the courts,60 was the requirement that the
defendants of a RICO action be associated with organized crime.6' Another
unsuccessful limitation was the requirement that plaintiffs show an injury "different
in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves" (the
51. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989) (Requiring
relationship and continuity to satisfy RICO's "pattern of racketeering" element).
52. Id.
53. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides that "[any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." (emphasis added).
55. Although the Justice Department adopted formal guidelines to avoid abusive or excessive
use of the broad language of RICO, private claimants invoking the broadly phrased statute have not
shown the same discipline. Rather, inventive private lawyers seeking treble damages argued
successfully for the most sweeping interpretation of RICO's broad language. See generally Philip
A. Lacovara and Geoffrey F. Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People: The
Runaway Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 New Eng. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1985-1986).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988 ed. & Supp. 1989).
57. Holmes v. SPIC, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1326 (1992) (O'Connor concurring) (citing Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151, 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2764 (1987)).
58. Such .allegations of misuse include the following: filing treble damage law suits in
connection with ordinary business disputes; RICO claims being used to displace well-established
federal remedial provisions; through the use of RICO claims, ordinary business people have been
labeled as "racketeers"; and the threat or use of a RICO claim has given plaintiffs improper leverage
to induce settlements. Norman Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA
L. Rev. 1, 4 n.9 (1989).
59. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 483, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3277 (1985).
60. Id.
61. See Hazen, supra note 43, at 401 n.27.
19191993]
1920 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
"racketeering injury" requirement). 2 This limitation was rejected in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.63 by the United States Supreme Court. There, the Court
wrote that the judiciary's distress at the outrageous uses to which civil RICO had
been put did not authorize the courts to "eliminate the private action in situations
where Congress has provided it."
The Court finally imposed a major limitation on RICO claims through the
"pattern" 65 requirement that the Court first mentioned in its 1985Sedima decision
and then approved in its 1989 decision in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co.66 In H.J., Inc., the Court rejected the "multiple scheme" requirement, yet
required RICO plaintiffs not only to show at least two related predicate acts, but
also that those acts either constitute or threaten continued criminal activity. 67
Thus, to maintain any RICO claim a plaintiff or prosecutor must show both
relationship and continuity-that the racketeering predicates are related, and that
they either constitute or threaten long-term criminal activity.68 This approach was
less limiting than the approach used by the Eighth Circuit in H.J,. Inc. ,69 but has
provided a strong limitation on RICO. Since H.J. Inc., defendants in several
reported cases have won on "no pattern" grounds.70
Less far reaching, though still important, was the recent attempt by courts to
limit civil RICO actions by applying the purchaser/seller requirement of 1Ob-5 to
RICO securities fraud claims. The Fourth,7" Sixth,72 and Tenth7 3 Circuits, all
held that the purchaser/seller standing requirement of lOb-5 piggybacks that rule
whenever it is the predicate action for a civil RICO claim. On the other hand, the
62. 473 U.S. 479, 485, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3279 (1985) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co.,
Inc., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984))..
63. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495, 105 S. Ct. 3284.
64. Id. at 499-500, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
65. Patrick A. Tuite & John L. Hines Jr., Rico's Pattern Requirement in the Seventh Circuit,
CBA Record, Mar. 1991, at 18. See also Dawn T. Trabeau, H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co.: Another Contribution to RICO Confusion, 50 La. L. Rev. 1219 (1990).
66. 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
67. "'Continuity' is both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period
of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of
repetition." Id. at 230, 109 S. Ct. at 2896.
68. H.J., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
69. The Eighth Circuit had held that for a pattern to exist there had to be more than one
scheme. H.J. Inc v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987).
70. See Apparel Art Int'l v. Jacobson, 967 F.2d 720 (1st Cir. 1992); Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d
1360 (4th Cir. 1992); Religious Technology Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2"d 364 (9th Cir. 1992);
Feinstein v. R.T.C., 942 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1991); Lange v. Hocker. 940 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1991);
Marshall-Silver Constr. Co., Inc. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990); American Eagle Credit
Corp. v. Gaskins, 920 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1990); Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1990);
SIL-FLO, Inc. v. S.F.H.C. Inc., 917 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1990); Johnston v. Wilbourne, 760 F. Supp.
578 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Hutchinson v. Wickes Cos., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
71. International Data Bank Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149.(4th Cir. 1987).
72. Nichols v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 706 F. Supp. 1309 (M.D. Tenn. 1989).
73. Chief Consol. Mining Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 725 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Utah 1989).
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Ninth74 and Eleventh" Circuits have held that a civil RICO securities action is
independent of the 1Ob-5 purchaser/seller requirement. The Supreme Court granted
writs in Holmes to decide the question.
The majority opinion, however, declined even to consider the purchaser/seller
question. It resolved the case on proximate cause grounds, leaving the purchas-
er/seller argument to the four concurring justices. Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion is therefore important in illustrating what points the majority opinion
pointedly refused to make. Believing that the Court should have "first consider[ed]
the standing question that was decided below, and briefed and argued here, and
which was the only clearly articulated question on which we granted certiorari," '
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Stevens, offered several reasons for
upholding the Ninth Circuit's (lower court in Holmes) position that a plaintiff need
not be a purchaser or a seller to assert RICO claims predicated by violations of
fraud in the sale of securities. There, the court had reasoned that because RICO
contained no purchaser/seller requirement, no such requirement existed; the civil
RICO action, unlike the private lOb-5 action, was created by Congress and can only
be limited by Congress; and RICO is to be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that under RICO there is no
purchaser/seller requirement.77
First, Justice O'Connor walked through the Ninth Circuit's analysis, approved
of all the steps, and reinforced them with quotes from Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., Inc 8 and Mobile Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United
Distribution Co.7 9 She then compared securities fraud to the other predicate acts
under RICO to illustrate the problem of referring to the predicate offenses to
determine standing. She pointed out that "a private RICO plaintiff could not allege
as predicates many of the acts that constitute the definition of racketeering activity.
The great majority of acts listed in § 1961(1) are criminal offenses for which only
a State or the Federal Government is the properparty to bring suit.""0 Private
parties had no standing of any kind under many of these predicate offenses,
regardless of their status as a purchaser or seller.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor did not accept the contention that an exception
should be made for "'fraud in the sale of securities' simply because it is well
established that a plaintiff in a civil action under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 must be
74. Vigman !!1, 908 F.2d 1461, 1465-67 (9th Cir. 1990).
75. Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (1 th Cir. 1987).
76. Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1322 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77. Vigman 111,908 F.2d 1461, 1465-67.
78. Quoting, "'If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner
forbidden by [RICO's] provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business
or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964 (c)." Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1323 (quoting
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 US 479, 495, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3284 (1985)).
79. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1323 (citing Mobile Oil Exploration & Producing. Southeast Inc. v.
United Distribution. Cos., I I I S. Ct. 615, 623 (1991), which held that "'any' encompasses 'all' for
purposes of interpreting the phrase "any person who is injured by reason of" a RICO violation.).
80. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1324 (emphasis added).
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either a purchaser or seller of securities."' Her rejection of that exception was
based on the language of RICO: "any offense" and "punishable under any law of
the United States." This language, together with other key language in RICO,
indicates that when the other elements of the RICO action are satisfied "any person
injured by reason of ... fraud in the sale of securities ... may recover threefold
his damages and a reasonable attorney fee."82 The above construction, she argued,
is based upon RICO's creation of private remedies out of conduct which was
previously subject only to criminal sanctions. Therefore, "the relevant predicate is
defined not by § 10(b) itself, but rather by" the statute83 "which authorizes
criminal sanctions against any person who willfully violates the Act or rules
promulgated thereunder." 4 She concluded that because the purchaser/seller
requirement is of no import in criminal prosecutions for willful violations of those
provisions, it is likewise inapplicable in Holmes.85 Simply stated,
If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner
forbidden by [RICO's] provisions, and the racketeering activities injure
the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under §
1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an additional...
requirement.'
81. Id.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988 ed. & Supp. 1989). Civil remedies
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not
limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any
person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same
type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making
due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. Pending final
determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory
performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal
proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from
denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil
proceeding brought by the United States.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988).
84. Holnes, 112 S. Ct. at 1324 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1323, (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. Inc.,, 473 U.S. 479, 495, 105 S. Ct.
3275. 3284 (1985)).
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Justice O'Conner next reasoned that because the Court could not divine from
the language of section 10(b) the express "intent of Congress" as to the contours of
a private cause of action under Rule l0b-5,87 the purchaser/seller standing
limitation in Rule 1Ob-5 damages actions was not a result of the phrase "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Rather, she concluded, the
purchaser/seller requirement rests on I Ob-5's "relationship with the other
provisions of the securities laws, and the practical difficulties in granting standing
in the absence of an executed transaction, neither of which are relevant in the RICO
context."88
In response to an argument that RICO securities fraud is narrower than lOb-5,
she lastly argues that although the RICO securities fraud action arises out of the
language "in the sale of securities," the word "in," rather than limiting the class of
RICO plaintiffs to those who were parties to a sale, merely confines the "class of
defendants to those proximately responsible for the plaintiff s injury and excluding
those only tangentially 'connect[ed] with' it."19
The strength of Justice O'Connor's reasoning compels a conclusion that the
10b-5 purchaser/seller rule should not apply to civil RICO securities fraud actions.
More importantly, however, the reasons supporting that conclusion likewise support
the majority's requirement of proximate cause and this note's conclusion-proxim-
ate cause is the sole test for standing. Whereas the purchaser/seller requirement
could be employed by the courts as a bright-line rule for securities fraud "proximate
cause," an actual proximate cause analysis better serves the purposes of RICO by
not denying standing to all non-purchasing or non-selling victims of securities
fraud. 9° An examination of the proximate cause function of the purchaser/seller
rule of lOb-5 in light of the remedial purposes of RICO illustrates the rationale of
the majority's focus on proximate cause.
While only Justice O'Connor and three other justices argued that RICO does
not import the purchaser/seller requirement from lOb-5, none disagreed with the
result in the case or with the majority's requiring proximate cause independently
of the purchaser/seller requirement. 9' What is striking about the opinion,
therefore, is that fivejustices refused to gloss over the distinction between Holmes'
derivative lawsuit version of the purchaser/seller rule and the Blue Chip Stamps rule
that merely prospective buyers had no standing to bring a lOb-5 claim. By
restricting Blue Chip Stamps to its facts and consequently not applying the rule
therein to Holmes, the majority refused to use the purchaser/seller rule as had lower
courts that had employed the rule to deny standing to derivative-type plaintiffs.
Without a "would-be" purchaser/seller-plaintiff, the majority was unwilling to
87. Id. at 1326 ( quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737, 95 S.
Ct. 1917, 1926 (1975)).
88. Id. (citations omitted)
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. See infra note 97.
91. Justice Scalia offerred a "zone of interest" variation to the proximate cause inquiry required
to determine RICO standing. Holmes v. SIPC, Id. at 1328 (Scalia. J.. concurring).
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address the purchaser/seller requirement as such. Ironically, the majority's refusal
to apply the purchaser/seller rule outside the facts of Blue Chip Stamps sharply
contrasts with the lower courts' traditional use of the rule-as a substitute for a
proximate cause analysis. In fact, the rule has rarely been used to deny standing to
"would be" purchasers or sellers; it was usually employed to deny standing to those
plaintiffs far removed from the injury.9 1 Despite the majority's refusal to address
a question-the purchaser/seller requirement-that did not arise from the facts, the
Court's consensus on proximate causation as the proper analysis does settle most
so-called purchaser/seller disputes.
III. THE FUNCTION OF THE PURCHASER/SELLER REQUIREMENT AND HoLMEs'
PROXIMATE CAUSE: THE BETTER APPROACH FOR RICO STANDING
The policy considerations employed by the Court in Blue Chip Stamps have
rarely driven the application of the purchaser/seller rule in actual cases.93 Rather,
the purchaser/seller rule has served as a bright-line test denying standing to large
classes of plaintiffs, most of whose injuries would have failed also under a more
sophisticated proximate cause analysis. A few of these plaintiffs might have been
denied standing under a proximate cause analysis, but those results could be
defended as a reasonable cost of an easily administered judicial rule. Having
created the 1Ob-5 private action in the first place, the Court certainly had the power
to control it. Under RICO, on ihe other hand, such an arbitrary limitation on the
express action provided therein could not and cannot be justified by the text of the
legislation.
Although the blanket purchaser/seller rule cannot be imposed on RICO, its
function is performed by the proximate cause analysis required in Holmes. The
purchaser/seller rule was frequently applied to deny standing to plaintiffs whose
claims could have been dismissed under a derivative lawsuit analysis.94 The Blue
Chip Stamps purchaser/seller requirement served as a simpler path to the same
92. See infra note 93.
93. In no case in which the Blue Chip Stamps rule was applied was there a plaintiff like the
one in Blue Chip Stamps. The purchaser/seller requirement has only been used to prevent indirectly,
remotely, or non-proximately injured parties from maintaining their lOb-5 actions. Specifically, the
rule has been used in an overwhelming majority of cases involving shareholder-type plaintiffs to
prevent these plaintiffs from bringing suit personally. However, the Court cited Blue Chip Stamps
extensively in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, I II S. Ct. 2749 (1991), and applied the
reasoning of Blue Chip Stamps to reject the possibility of resting an "otherwise nonexistent § 14(a)
action on psychological enquiry alone" because such "would threaten just the sort of strike suits and
attrition by discovery that Blue Chip Stamps sought to discourage." Id. at 2760.
94. In fact, very few lOb-5 cases have even been brought by prospective purchasers or sellers.
The rule has been applied to deny standing only in cases involving RICO actions to deny
shareholder-type plaintiffs from bringing suit. See generally H. E. Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d
1041 (8th Cir. 1986). The reasoning for the purchaser/seller requirement of Blue Chip Stamps has
also been used without the requirement itself to deny standing on the basis of insufficient proof of
causality. Id. at 1045-46.
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result by allowing courts an additional and easily applied reason to deny standing
to non-purchaser and non-sellers injured only derivatively by injury to an entity that
itself was a purchaser or seller. Thus, the purchaser/seller requirement has actually
functioned as a quick reference test for determining whether proximate cause exists,
and consequently whether the plaintiff lacks standing. Holmes therefore revisits the
origin of the lOb-5 purchaser/seller requirement by focusing on policy consider-
ations to determine requisite causality-an exercise that closely resembles the
shorthand (and practical) function of the purchaser/seller requirement and most
proximate cause inquiries.
95
Because the purchaser/seller requirement has been used as a bright-line rule to
deny standing to derivatively injured plaintiffs, and because such plaintiffs will also
be denied standing under the reasoning in Holmes, the purchaser/seller issue is for
most, if not for all, purposes resolved. The first type of plaintiff, a non-purchaser
whose injury is merely derivative of the actual purchasing entity's injury, is denied
standing under both Holmes and the purchaser/seller requirement. The second type
of plaintiff, one who purchases manipulated securities, however, is injured "by
reason of" securities fraud. This plaintiff therefore has an injury distinct from any
corporate injury and a claim that will likely survive a proximate cause inquiry as
well." The third type of plaintiff, however, is the Blue Chip Stamps prospective
purchaser. This plaintiff's injury is not merely the result of his interest in the
collective injury of any corporation, nor is he a purchaser or seller of the
manipulated securities. This question was left open in Holmes because the case did
not involve that type of plaintiff; rather, it involved the first type. Nonetheless, the
prospective purchaser or seller will lack standing because this plaintiff's injury is
frequently speculative; this factor has been fatal to many RICO claims at the
proximate-cause stage of analysis.97 In addition to the Blue Chip Stamps plaintiff,
95. Justice Souter, in Virginia Bankshares, commented on the role and origin of limitations on
implied actions as related to the "requisite causality" between the statement and the injury. Further,
citing Blue Chip Stamps as the example for such analyses he wrote:
Blue Chip Stamps set an example worth recalling as a preface to specific policy analysis
of the consequences of recognizing responents' first theory, that a desire to avoid minority
shareholders' illwill should suffice to justify recognizing the requisite causality of a proxy
statement needed to garner that minority support.
Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2764-65.
96. See Manufacturer Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Securities Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20-22 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S, 1066, 107 S.Ct. 952 (1987).
97. See Forsyth v. Humana Inc., 62 U.S.L.W. 2100 (D. Neb. 1993); Barr Laboratories, Inc. v.
Quantum Pharmics, Inc., 1993 WL 262625, *3 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Shepard v. American Honda Motor
Co., Inc., 822 F.Supp. 625, 627-29 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Imagineering Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 976
F.2d 1303, 1310 (9th Cir. 1992). The speculative injury renders difficult and plays a role in an
examination of the link between that injury and the wrongful act. For RICO standing purposes,
however, perhaps the standard of proof for a claimed injury should be lower allowing a showing of
protection by the prohibition of the alleged predicate act to permit these plaintiffs access to the
courts. Once in court the issue of damages, if questionable, will surely be litigated. However, the
RICO standing standard of proof for injury has actually been elevated, potentially motivating much
litigation at the threshold of every civil RICO action. In Shepard v. American Honda Motor Co.,
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the last type of plaintiff may include a wide variety of victims whose injuries were
non-derivative and indirect, yet still contemplated by Congress as compensable
under RICO. The standing of these plaintiffs should be determined through the
common-law proximate cause analysis suggested in Holmes. However, if these
plaintiffs' injuries are also purely speculative, it is unlikely that they were
"proximately caused" by the wrongful act.98 So, if Holmes and the purchas-
er/seller requirement render nearly identical results in those cases involving non-
purchasers or non-sellers, what is the significance of the Court's refusal to apply
the purchaser/seller rule and its insistance on a proximate cause analysis? Through
Holmes, the Court adopts a flexible RICO standing analysis-proximate
cause-that applies to all civil RICO actions, regardless of the predicate acts
alleged.
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSE IS THE PROPER ANALYSIS FOR RICO STANDING
Because the majority in Holmes thought it necessary to provide an analytically
sound approach to RICO standing, that is the approach that should be utilized by
Inc., 822 F.Supp. 625, 628 (N.D. Cal. 1993), the court, analyzing Imagineering Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific
Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1310 (1992). discussed proof of injury in the threshold question of proximate
cause as follows:
The Ninth Circuit in imagineering also preserved the validity of its line of cases
addressing the RICO requirement of proof of concrete financial loss. Indeed there is
some suggestion in the Imagineering opinion that the Ninth Circuit, to recognize a
cognizable RICO injury, might even require proof that plaintiff actually paid money out
as a result of racketeering activity.
For the following reasons, which seem to this Court to echo concerns traditionally
embodied in the proximate cause requirement, the Inagineering court found the plaintiffs
had failed to allege a sufficiently concrete financial loss.
Shepard, 822 F.Supp. at 628 (citing Imagineering, 976 F.2d at 1310) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). A rule that requires RICO plaintiffs to actually pay out money, albeit helpful in the
proximate cause inquiry, is strikingly familiar to the purchaser/seller requirement rejected in Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion. Nonetheless, it will often be difficult to distinguish a determination
of speculative injury from the initial (standing) proximate cause inquiry. For this reason, and to
avoid premature litigation of the merits of each civil RICO case. Justice Scalia's brand of proximate
cause for RICO standing is helpful. Resembling Louisiana's Duty/Risk approach to proximate cause,
Justice Scalia's "zone-of-interest" test "seeks to determine whether, apart from the directness of the
injury, the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be benefitted by the provision [prohibition
of alleged predicate act] at issue." Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1328 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The zone-of-interest test, according to Justice Scalia, varies with the underlying
violation. Thus, under this test the crucial question is: "Was this predicate act prohibited to protect
this type of person from this type of injury?" The answer to this question, and the standing of the
plaintiff, is dependent upon the reasons such a prohibition would be enacted, not on the degree of
causal connection and ability to prove injury. By bifurcating the proximate cause inquiry into (1)
standing (via Justice Scalia's zone-of-interest test) and (2) recovery (a fact-specific proximate cause
inquiry), the threshold issue of standing may be determined without an involved argument of the
merits.
98. See supra note 97.
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lower courts.99 Simpler approaches, like the purchaser/seller rule, that do not
involve a thorough proximate cause analysis, but are concerned only with
categorization of the injury, are, in light of Holmes, insufficient means to dismiss
civil RICO actions. Two such "simple" approaches that should be examined in
light of the Holmes decision are the direct injury requirement and the "investment
injury" requirement.
The direct injury requirement for RICO standing has recently received both
judicial acceptance'00 and academic criticism.' O' A recent law review comment
criticized the direct injury requirement for being result-oriented, and consequently
inappropriate in the civil RICO jurisprudence.'0 2 That comment correctly argued
that proximate cause is the sounder approach.
Fortunately, Holmes embraces proximate cause as the proper analysis. Indeed,
quoting Associated General Contractors, Justice Souter clarifies his emphasis on
the word "direct":
"[T]he infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtually impossi-
ble to announce a black letter rule that will dictate the result in every
case."'0 3 Thus, our use of the term "direct" should merely be under-
stood as a reference to the proximate-cause enquiry that is informed by
the concerns set out in the text. We do not necessarily use it in the same
sense as courts before us have, and intimate no opinion on results they
have reached.'O°
Although the majority made no express rejection of the direct injury requirement,
by adopting proximate cause as the standard in the context of an action analogous
to a shareholder suit, the opinion stands for the proposition that directness is only
part of the proximate cause inquiry-sometimes determinative (in shareholder or
creditor suits) and sometimes merely considered.
The advantage of Holmes is that it provides an analytical framework within
which derivatively injured plaintiffs lack standing, while others may, depending on
99. Id.
100. Ocean Energy 11, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740(5th Cir. 1989); Schact
v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983); Bennett v.
Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008, 104 S. Ct. 927 (1983); Hanna
Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1982);
101. Eric W. McNiel, Civil RICO Standing: Direct/Indirect Distinction Should Not be Taken
Sitting Down, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1239 (1990).
102. Id. at 1239.
103. Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1320 n.20 (1992) (quoting Associated General
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters. 459 U.S. 519. 536, 103 S. Ct. 897, 908 (1983)).
104. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1320 n.20 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (referring to Ocean
Energy II v. Alexander, 868 F.2d 744-47 (5th Cir. 1989), where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that "a person will be considered injured 'by reason ofr a RICO violation if the predicate acts
constitute (1) factual (but for) causation and (2) legal (proximate) causation of the alleged injury."
The Ocean Energy court pointed out that direct/indirect injury is only determinative in cases
involving shareholder or creditor actions. Id. at 744-45.).
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the specific circumstances of each case, be allowed to maintain their RICO action.
Therefore, the Court's emphasis on directness is relevant only in cases involving an
injury that merely arises out of the plaintiff's interest in another person's injury.
If the plaintiff's injury is purely contingent on another's injury, in the sense that his
injury is merely derivative of the injury suffered by an entity in which he has some
interest as an owner or creditor, then he lacks standing under Holmes. He has
suffered no injury distinct from the injury suffered by the entity. But it does not
follow that a plaintiff lacks standing under Holmes merely because his injury
happened to occur as a result of two causal steps rather than one. The standing of
these plaintiffs should be determined on the basis of all of the common-law
principles of proximate cause' 0'-not directness alone. Unfortunately, however,
Holmes is being read to reinforce the erroneous direct injury standing require-
ment.1°6 Specifically, courts are applying Holmes as if it advocated a bright-line
test based on "directness" of the injury.
In Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of
Delaware,'0 7 the court, although correct in its conclusion, referred to the
emphasis on directness in Holmes to deny standing to an intended victim of the
predicate offense. In Lifschultz the plaintiff alleged that in the mid-1960's, the
teamsters president, Jimmy Hoffa, decided that concentration of the "Less than
Truckload" market in a small number of trucking companies would be in the best
interest of the Teamsters. The plaintiff asserted that in order "to create a price
squeeze to reduce or eliminate the profits of their competitors," defendants
provided false information to the rate bureaus who developed tariffs based upon
this information.0 8 Ultimately, these allegedly deflated rates diminished the
plaintiff's (defendants' competitors) ability to profit.' °9
Because (1) any harm from the alleged conspiracy would be "purely contingent
on how the rate bureau and the ICC acted based on the alleged predicate acts"' ' 0
and (2) the "general tendency of the law is to not go beyond the first step," the court
held that the injury was not proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. The
court wrote, "Lifschultz is, at best, the second step from the alleged predicate acts,
and more probably is best described as three or four steps removed from the alleged
predicate acts.' The court concluded that because the plaintiff's position in
relation to the act was indirect, it lacked standing. Thus, the court in Lifschultz used
Holmes' emphasis on directness outside the context of a derivative injury case.
105. Justice Scalia's zone-of-interest test provides particular guidance for the proximate cause
analysis conducted for purposes of standing. See supra note 97.
106. In the most recent supplement to Thomas L. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities
Regulation (2d ed. 1990), the author states, "Principles of proximate cause limit the range of potential
plaintiffs in private RICO actions. Accordingly, secondary victims do not have standing to bring
RICO actions." Id. at 109 (citing Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992)) (emphasis added).
107. 805 F. Supp. 1277 (D.S.C. 1992).
108. Id. at 1281
109. Id. at 1281-1282.
110. Id. at 1291.
111. Id.
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Despite the court's reference to "steps" in the chain of causation as determinative
of the standing issue, the position of the plaintiff (i.e., first, second, or third step)
in relation to the predicate act and other parties' injuries is only dispositive in
derivative injury cases. A pure proximate cause inquiry should have been
conducted without such reliance on directness. A more thorough inquiry would
have avoided the possibility of confusing Holmes' use of the term "direct" with the
Court's adoption of an absolute direct injury requirement.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also has read RICO proximate
cause under the holding in Holmes to require an injury not causally dependent on
an injury of a third person in Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co.",2 In
Imagineering the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, prime contractors, used a
scheme to avoid complying with state regulations designed to assist minority and
woman-owned business enterprises (MWBE). The scheme allegedly involved the
defendants' use of certified MWBEs to act as "conduits," "fronts," or "pass
throughs.""' 3 The plaintiffs alleged that this administrative use of the MWBEs
caused actual MWBEs to lose profits. The court held that like the plaintiff's injuries
in Holmes, the plaintiffs' alleged injuries in Imagineering depended solely upon the
intervening injury of a third party. In Imagineering the court found that the prime
contractors' inability to secure the contracts was the direct cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries, and such causal dependence amounted to an intervening cause. "Under
Holmes, the ... plaintiffs are missing the direct relationship needed to show Kiewit
proximately caused their injuries."" 4 Furthermore, the court referred to the direct
injury requirement under Holmes' proximate cause test as being so crucial to the
determination of standing that indirect injuries may alone preclude suits for
otherwise proximately caused injuries. The court specifically rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that an indirect injury may nonetheless be proximately caused
for purposes of civil RICO standing: "[T]he Supreme Court agreed that our circuit
properly interpreted § 1964(c) to require proximate causation. It did not agree,
however, that the link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's loss
could satisfy the direct injury requirement.""5 This statement, although true as
applied to derivative injuries, should not be applied to cases where the plaintiff's
injuries are merely caused by injuries to third parties, as opposed to injuries that
exist only to the extent of the plaintiff's interest in the primary victim's independent
loss.
In Imagineering, the MWBEs losses depended on the injuries to the prime
contractors, but that dependence was causal dependence, not mere interest in the
first injury. The MWBEs injuries were their own injuries, even though the losses
they sufferred would not have occurred "but for" the losses suffered by the prime
contractors. Confusing this subtle distinction between the Court's use of directness
112. 976 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1992).
113. Id. at 1305
114. Id. at 1312 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 1311-12 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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in the context of derivative lawsuits and its requiring common-law proximate cause
will lead to faulty analysis and denial of standing to plaintiffs whose injuries are
merely "beyond the first step." Such a restriction was neither intended by Congress
to apply to RICO nor intended by the majority in Holmes in its application of
proximate cause.
Another simple method of disimissing civil RICO actions, the "investment
injury" requirement, divides the federal circuits.'16 The majority view is that to
have standing to sue for violations of section 1962(a), 1 7 which prohibits use or
investment of income derived "from a pattern of racketeering activity" in an
enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, a plaintiff must show injury by reason
of the use or investment of racketeering income rather than the predicate acts
themselves."' However, for reasons forwarded in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co.,
Inc., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., "9 Busby v.
Crown Supply, Inc., 20 and by Justice O'Connor in her argument against the
arbitrary imposition of the purchaser/seller requirement on civil RICO, this trend
should be reversed.
Holmes' proximate cause requirement arises under RICO's causation
language, "by reason of." This language is from section 1964(c) which, alone,
permits the civil RICO action. To recover damages in a civil suit through section
1964(c) for a violation of section 1962(a), a plaintiff must show (1) receipt of
income (2) from a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) the use or investment of this
income in an enterprise, and after Holmes, (4) proximate cause. For the "invest-
ment injury" requirement to survive Holmes, therefore, proximate cause must be
required not only between the alleged predicate acts and the injury, but between the
investment and the injury. Nothing in section 1964(c), however, requires that the
proximate cause "link" be between the investment (as opposed to a predicate act)
116. See, e.g., Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., 787 F. Supp 1480 (D.N.J. 1992).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). Subsection (a) of this statute provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt
in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title
18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income,
or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes
of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of
the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if
the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family,
and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the
outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the
power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
118. See, e.g., Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1991); Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990); Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 899 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1990).
119. 473 U.S. 606, 105 S.Ct. 3291 (1985) (per curiam).
120. 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990).
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and the alleged injury. Moreover, nothing in section 1964(c) limits the compensa-
ble racketeering injuries to those caused after and by the investment and/or use of
the income."
Holmes' proximate cause for RICO standing does not require additional
causation between the prohibited acts under section 1962 and the alleged injury.
It is well-settled that injuries flowing from the predicate acts listed in section 1961
are compensable under RICO. In Sedima, recall that the United States Supreme
Court rejected the "racketeering injury" requirement. Specifically, the Court wrote:
[W]e perceive no distinct "racketeering injury" requirement. Given that
"racketeering activity" consists of no more and no less than commission
of a predicate act, § 1961(1), we are initially doubtful about a requirement
of a "racketeering injury" separate from the harm from the predicate acts.
A reading of the statute belies any such requirement.... If the defendant
engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by
these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his
business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c).' 22
By rejecting the "racketeering injury" requirement, the Sedima Court announced
that a civil RICO plaintiff need only prove causation between a predicate act and
the injuries alleged. This announcement was amplified in Haroco when the Court
held that injuries from the predicate acts alone are compensable under RICO.
There the Court wrote:
The submission that the injury must flow not from the predicate acts
themselves but from the fact that they were performed as part of the
conduct of an enterprise suffers from the same defects as the amorphous
and unfounded restrictions on the RICO private action we rejected in
[Sedima]. '
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Holmes also supports RICO
compensation for injuries that result from predicate acts. She based her rejection
of the purchaser/seller requirement for civil RICO security fraud actions on the fact
that "the relevant predicate is defined not by § 10(b) itself, but rather by" the
statute 24 "which authorizes criminal sanctions against any person who willfully
violates the Act or rules promulgated thereunder."' 25 Because RICO creates
private remedies out of actions that were previously subject only to criminal
sanctions, and the majority of those illegal actions defined in RICO are the
121. In Busby, the court correctly argued that the investment injury rule is not consistent with
the language or the purpose of RICO. Busby, 896 F.2d at 836-40.
122. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495, 105 S.Ct. at 3284 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
123. Haroco. 473 U.S. at 609, 105 S. Ct. at 3292.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988).
125. Id.
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predicate acts in section 1961, the only necessary proximate cause link lies between
those acts and the injury.
Holmes' proximate cause requirement for civil RICO standing refines the
causation requirement implied in Sedima and Haroco; namely, there need only be
a causal link between any of the predicate acts and the injury. After Holmes, that
single causal link must be sufficient to constitute a proximate cause. Additionally,
given Sedima and Haroco, lower courts are restricted from requiring a similar and
additional causation requirement between the investment and the injury. The test
for civil RICO standing, as stated in Holmes, is proximate cause between a
predicate act and an injury. Because the nature of the injury is defined by its cause,
and cause sufficient for RICO standing purposes is proximate cause between a
predicate act and an injury, the "investment injury" requirement must fall.
In summary, (1) "investment injury" requires an injury caused by an
investment; (2) RICO's language addressing causation, "by reason of," was
interpreted in Holmes to require proximate cause between the securities fraud (a
predicate act) and the injury; (3) Sedima and Haroco prohibit additional (or plural)
causation requirements for civil RICO standing; (4) because "investment injury"
is, for all practical purposes, an additional causation requirement, it is replaced by
Holmes' general requirement of proximate cause.
The leading case against the "investment injury" requirement is Busby v.
Crown Supply, Inc. 126 In Busby, Judge Winter writing for the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit rejected the "investment injury" requirement on grounds
similar to those argued above. Citing Sedima and Haroco, he found it clear "that
the Supreme Court was referring to § 1962 as a whole in both cases." 1
Additionally, Judge Winter offered several practical reasons for rejecting the
"investment injury" requirement. 128
Although the other circuits were in error by requiring an investment injury for
section 1962(a) actions, they were correct in recognizing that such injuries may be
compensable under RICO. However, if the direct injury requirement criticized
126. 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990).
127. Id. at 839.
128. Where a corporation is the "person" that commits the racketeering acts and
benefits from them, that corporation causes injury to several entities at
different stages of the racketeering activity .... Some courts that have
followed the "investment use" rule assume, without analysis, that the victims
of corporate racketeering activity are not injured in the process of the
corporation's receipt and use of the illegally obtained income....
If the rule advocated by defendant is followed, however, corporate liability
under RICO will be eviscerated. Given that the named "person" and the
named "enterprise" must be separate for § 1962(c) purposes, plaintiffs injured
by corporate racketeering have only § 1962(a) to turn to for relief. Invoking
the "investment use" rule would close this avenue off, as it is virtually
impossible to prove that the invested income caused the alleged injury.
Id. at 838-39 (citing, inter alia, Louisiana Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp.
781, 806-07 (E.D. La. 1986)) (other citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
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above maintains the momentum it has gained since Holmes, no "investment
injuries" will be compensable because nearly all such injuries flow indirectly from
the predicate acts. Only in the odd instance where a victim has been injured solely
by an investment would there be no threat of the injury being categorized as
"indirect." But, ironically, these plaintiffs, like the ones in Blue Chip Stamps,
would bear the nearly impossible burden of proving a speculative economic injury.
Thus, if the "direct injury" requirement becomes the rule, injuries that were once
required to maintain section 1962(a) standing will be altogether removed from the
list of compensable injuries under RICO.'2 9
On the other hand, if the "direct injury" requirement and the "investment
injury" requirement are now two rules for RICO standing, there can never be a
section 1962(a) plaintiff. Specifically, if Justice Souter's emphasis on directness
is applied dispositively to situations not analogous to derivative lawsuits to deny
plaintiffs standing, and the "investment injury" requirement for section 1962(a)
remains in force, the only plaintiffs with standing under that interpretation of
Holmes are denied standing because their injury is by nature not the indirect result
of an "investment"-not an investment injury! Hence, these two judicially created
bright-line rules jointly and impermissibly yank a legislatively created remedy out
of the statutes.
The best solution is to treat Holmes' proximate cause as the sole test for RICO
standing. 30 Through proximate cause, all of the concerns previously expressed
via bright-line rules may be addressed without offense to the legislative remedies
of RICO.
CONCLUSION
Congress does not create implicitly self-destructing remedies, and an
interpretation that leads to such a result is simply a judicial repeal of legislation-a
practice not permitted in a government of separate powers. This absurd result
reflects the competing interests between the correct and incorrect interpretation of
Holmes and the "investment injury" requirement. The possibility of conflicting
tests is eleviated by applying only one test for RICO standing-proximate
cause.131
Holmes v. SIPC affects RICO standing in several ways. The Court's opinion
merges the primary purpose of derivative lawsuit standing requirements with RICO
standing requirements, and as a result of such merger, Holmes substitutes a better
analytical framework for the previous function of the purchaser/seller rule. By
addressing only the question that arose in Holmes-whether plaintiffs suffering
129. For a similar observation concerning the direct injury requirement and the racketeering
injury requirement, see McNeil, supra note 101, at 1254. With the "investment injury" requirement,
however, there is now actual tension between two RICO standing tests existing in the jurisprudence.
130. Justice Scalia's brand of proximate cause is perhaps the best approach for the standing stage
of analysis. See supra note 97.
131. Id.
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injuries purely derivative of injuries to third parties may bring a civil RICO
action-the Court provided much-needed guidance for determining civil RICO
standing. Such guidance, if closely followed, will clarify not only the purchas-
er/seller issue, but prevent further distortion of RICO standing by limited bright-
line tests. In short, the new analysis for RICO standing guides courts away from
simplistic bright-line tests such as the direct injury requirement and the "investment
injury" requirement. Because Holmes directs lower courts to conduct proximate
cause inquiries to determine RICO standing, it should not be read as a test
forestalling such analysis.
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